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TIMELINESS IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION APPEALS PROCESS:




Anecdotal evidence suggests that during the recession of
1989-1992, unemployment insurance claimants suffered unprec-
edented delays in the receipt of their benefits. Advocates reported
that claimants who were initially denied benefits suffered delays
of months, and even years, before the state administrative appeals
process resolved their claims. Although federal law establishes
timeliness standards for processing appeals, many states did not
meet those standards. In this Article, the Authors discuss and
analyze the results of a nationwide review of state compliance
with federal timeliness standards. They then assess the state and
federal responses to the increased number of unemployment in-
surance claims and identify trends that result in significant de-
lays in processing unemployment insurance appeals. The Authors
argue that the reporting system required by federal law (1) is
inadequate as a tool to project increases in workload which will
inevitably result in delays; (2) actually penalizes states who are
successful in resolving high numbers of old claims; and (3) inef-
fectively enforces compliance with timeliness standards. They sug-
gest changes to the reporting requirements and to the relationship
between the United States Department of Labor and the states,
which they believe will enable states to effectively anticipate
increased appeals and to implement plans for dealing with in-
creased workload before serious backlogs and delays occur.
* Staff Attorney, Community Legal Services, Phila., Pa. B.A. 1982, Albright
College; J.D. 1985, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
** Staff Attorney, California Rural Legal Assistance, Santa Rosa, Cal. B.A.
1976, University of Colorado; J.D. 1979, Santa Clara University School of Law.
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our acknowledgement. They include: the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation, which provided us with the opportunity to present this paper at the
Symposium and with a generous grant for analysis of the raw data at the heart of
the Article; Mary Ann Wyrsch, Director, Unemployment Insurance Service, United
States Department of Labor, and her staff, for their responses to our requests for
information; and, for their comments and assistance, our legal services col-
leagues-the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County; Maurice Emsellem and Sue
McNeill, National Employment Law Project; Jon L. Sasser, Nevada Legal Services;
Monica Halas, Greater Boston Legal Services; and particularly Anita Myerson,
Legal Aid Society of Cleveland. Most of all, we wish to thank Rick McHugh for his
invaluable assistance and for sharing his unsurpassed knowledge of unemployment
compensation.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article was inspired by the Authors' personal involve-
ment in the crisis that affected tens of thousands of unem-
ployment compensation claimants during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. During that period, unprecedented numbers of
individuals turned to the unemployment compensation system
for relief. Because of a variety of problems, however, states
could not respond to their needs in a timely manner. This was
particularly true with respect to claimants who were denied
benefits in the first instance but appealed and ultimately
prevailed. Anecdotal evidence shows that, during this period,
thousands of claimants in each state waited from four to twelve
months for decisions on their cases, all the while going without
benefits.
In 1992, for example, Joyce Jones' filed for unemployment
insurance benefits in California after she had been discharged
for refusing to work on her day off because on that day she was
at the hospital with her only daughter, who was having an
emergency caesarean section. Ms. Jones was denied benefits
after the employer submitted an objection to the claim. She had
no opportunity to submit additional information to the Em-
ployment Development Department before it acted on the
employer's objection. Ms. Jones waited longer than six months
for her appeal hearing, while unsuccessfully searching for
work. Although Ms. Jones ultimately prevailed, this grand-
mother-who had worked her whole life, had raised two
children, and had never before asked for any public assis-
tance-was unable to pay her rent, was evicted from her home
and reduced to living in a homeless shelter, and ultimately was
forced to apply for and receive general assistance and food
stamps.
The administrative system designed specifically to prevent
this scenario failed miserably and continues to fail-not only in
California, but throughout the nation. This Article analyzes
that failure and suggests improvements to the system, im-
provements that might significantly reduce the likelihood that
claimants in future recessions will face the kind of suffering
and humiliation Ms. Jones endured. In supporting these
1. Ms. Jones' name has been changed to protect her privacy.
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suggestions, the Authors rely on knowledge and experience
gained through their advocacy with the state agencies respon-
sible for appeals promptness in California and Pennsylvania.
They also rely on information from other states collected from
various United States Department of Labor (USDOL) publi-
cations, written and computer-generated statistical reports
submitted by states to the USDOL (called ETA 5-130s), inter-
nal documents, and USDOL correspondence with the State
Employment Services Agencies (SESAs).2
As this Article demonstrates, appeals promptness in state
unemployment insurance systems has been an issue for years.
Although the USDOL has established national criteria for
measuring appeals promptness, many states persistently have
failed to meet those bench marks, especially during the reces-
sionary years of 1989 through 1993. Moreover, the standards
that the USDOL developed and the data that it collects do not
indicate reliably the actual impact of delays on claimants. The
data and standards do not report the actual number of days a
claimant waits or the average number of days required to
2. The USDOL produced the SESA correspondence in response to four Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) requests. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). The first request, in
1993, asked for all correspondence and formal notices of action regarding the SESAs'
failure to comply with second-level appeals timeliness standards. Letter from Erica
Etelson, Law Clerk, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, to Regional Administra-
tor, United States Department of Labor (Apr. 30, 1993) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Request No. 1]. In response, the
USDOL produced information for nearly all of the 53 SESAs. The second request, in
December 1994, sought all formal and informal reports that the USDOL had pro-
duced or that the SESAs had submitted regarding appeals promptness. Letter from
Cynthia L. Rice, Staff Attorney, California Rural Legal Assistance, to FOIA/PA
Coordinator, Employment and Training Administration, United States Department
of Labor (Dec. 29, 1994) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) [hereinafter Request No. 2]. The third request, in January 1995, asked for
an update of the first request and for similar information with respect to first-level
appeals timeliness. Letter from Cynthia L. Rice, Staff Attorney, California Rural
Legal Assistance, to Mary Ann Wyrsch, Director, Unemployment Insurance Service,
United States Department of Labor (Jan. 11, 1995) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Request No. 3]. Documents from a
limited number of states were produced in response to the third request, but the
USDOL did not have adequate time to respond with respect to all states. Therefore,
this Article has been written without benefit of that information. The fourth request,
dated January 5, 1995, sought information concerning the Performance Measure-
ment Review, Performance Enhancement, and Case Aging Pilot projects. Letter from
Sharon Dietrich, Community Legal Services, to Mary Ann Wyrsch, Director, Unem-
ployment Insurance Service, United States Department of Labor (Jan. 5, 1995) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Request
No. 4].
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resolve an appeal.3 But even with the relatively sterile statis-
tical information available, it is evident that failures in appeals
promptness resulted in a significant number of people suffering
from the ravages of unemployment during the recent recession.
Part I summarizes the federal statutory and regulatory
scheme that establishes the unemployment insurance program
and imposes on participating states timeliness requirements for
processing unemployment insurance appeals. Part II discusses
the unprecedented numbers of unemployment insurance ap-
peals filed during the recessionary period and the impact of
these filings on the states' ability to process appeals in a timely
manner. Part II also identifies other factors that contributed to
the huge backlogs and substantial delays in processing appeals,
including the lack of effective oversight by and assistance from
the USDOL. Part III suggests specific ways to improve USDOL
oversight and cooperation with the states. The Article con-
cludes that such improvements will enable states not only to
respond more quickly to future recessionary activity, but also to
prevent the build-up of huge backlogs and the attendant delays
that increase rather than alleviate the economic insecurity of
the unemployed.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR APPEALS PROMPTNESS
The United States unemployment insurance system is a
cooperative program administered by the participating states
and territories, and financed in part through federal grants
subject to oversight by the USDOL. The fifty states, the
District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico
make up the fifty-three SESAs that provide intrastate and
interstate benefits to the unemployed, primarily by using
unemployment tax monies that employers pay into the ap-
proved state program in compliance with federal law.4 In
addition to the payroll taxes submitted to the states, covered
employers must pay a federal excise tax.5 Employers, howev-
er, receive a credit of up to ninety percent of their federal tax
3. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, MA 5-130 Form; U.S. Dep't of Labor, ETA 5-130
Form.
4. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1994).
5. See Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 US.C. § 3301 (1994).
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to the extent that they pay such amounts to a state program
meeting the requirements of federal law.
6
Federal grant monies finance the bulk of the administrative
costs of state unemployment insurance systems, including the
appeals process. The Social Security Act establishes certain
minimum requirements for state programs, and provides that
"[tihe Secretary of Labor shall make no certification for pay-
ment to any State" absent a finding that state law meets these
minimum requirements under the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act (FUTA).7 In the event that a state fails to meet the mini-
mum requirements, the Secretary of Labor may suspend pay-
ment of administrative and other grant monies, subject to
reinstatement when the state comes into compliance.'
One of these minimum requirements is that state law include
provisions for methods of administration that are reasonably
calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compen-
sation "when due."9 This "when due" clause, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in California Department of Human Re-
sources Development v. Java,1 ° embodies the purpose of the
unemployment compensation program. As the Court describes,
that purpose is:
To give prompt if only partial replacement of wages to the
unemployed, to enable workers to tide themselves over,
until they get back to their old work or find other employ-
ment, without having to resort to relief. Unemployment
benefits provide cash to a newly unemployed worker at a
time when otherwise he would have nothing to spend,
6. Id. § 3302. Because the FUTA imposes only a tax liability, without any
corresponding payments to unemployed workers, a determination that a state's
program does not comply with federal law would deprive employers of their credit
without the accrual of benefits to their employees. Id. §§ 3302, 3304. This is a
significant incentive for state programs to comply with federal law.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a); 26 U.S.C. § 3304.
8. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(c); 42 U.S.C. § 503(b); 20 C.F.R. § 601.5(a)(4) (1995).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) provides:
The Secretary of Labor shall make no certification for payment to any State
unless he finds that the law of such State, approved by the Secretary of Labor
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, includes provision for ... [sluch
methods of administration .. .as are found by the Secretary of Labor to be
reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation
when due ....
Id. (citation omitted).
10. 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
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serving to maintain the recipient at subsistence levels
without the necessity of his turning to welfare or private
charity."
In Java, the Court struck down a state law that suspended
payment of benefits when an employer appealed an initial
determination in favor of the claimant. 12 The Court found that
the ensuing delay 3 in receipt of benefits defeated the purpose
of the unemployment compensation program. 14 The Court
concluded that the "when due" clause encompasses the "con-
gressional objective of getting money into the pocket of the
unemployed worker at the earliest point that is administra-
tively feasible."5 This oft-quoted phrase manifests both the
intent of Congress in establishing this program and the some-
times desperate circumstances of those who seek the program's
benefits. Yet, the enforcement mechanism that the USDOL
established to monitor compliance with this standard has not
been adequate. 6
In response to Java and subsequent unemployment com-
pensation litigation, the USDOL promulgated regulations in
1972 interpreting the "when due" clause as it applies to the
appeals process.' 7 The regulations require that state law and
practice provide appeals hearings and decisions "with the
greatest promptness that is administratively feasible."'8 The
regulations establish a phase-in period and set specific criteria,
commonly called "appeals promptness standards," for first-level
appeals, which typically consist of in-person evidentiary hear-
ings." No specific standards were established for second-level
11. Id. at 131-32 (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 123, 135.
13. At that time, processing an appeal in California generally took between six
and seven weeks. Id. at 128. Although that period is too long to comply with the
current standard for first-level appeals, see infra text accompanying note 21, it is
much shorter than the delays claimants routinely experienced during the last reces-
sion. See discussion infra Part II.A.
14. Java, 402 U.S. at 134-35. The Court returned to this point in Fusari v.
Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 387-88 (1975), emphasizing that the fundamental purpose
of the "when due" clause is timeliness. See also Wilkinson v. Abrams, 627 F.2d 650,
661 n.14 (3d Cir. 1980) (clarifying that Java teaches that "[t]he critical factor is
timely payment to all eligible persons, whether their eligibility is upheld initially or
only after one or more appeals').
15. Java, 402 US. at 135 (emphasis added).
16. See discussion infra Part II.C.
17. 20 C.F.R. § 650.3 (1995).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 650.4. These standards became effective in 1975.
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appeals, which federal law does not require and which gen-
erally involve review for error of first-level appeals.2 °
The regulations currently provide that a state will be in
substantial compliance with the appeals promptness standard
if it issues at least sixty percent of all first-level appeals
decisions within thirty days, and eighty percent of all first-level
appeals decisions within forty-five days.2' Independently, in
1982, the USDOL established "desired levels of achievement"
(DLAs) for second-level appeals. 22 These DLAs require that
states aim for resolution of forty percent of second-level appeals
within forty-five days and eighty percent within seventy-five
days.23
The regulations also require that every year "each State shall
submit an appeals performance plan showing how it will
operate during the following calendar year so as to achieve or
maintain [the appeals promptness standards] .,,24 This require-
ment has not been enforced; rather, it has been replaced
largely by a requirement that a state submit a "corrective
action plan" (CAP) with respect to each performance standard
or desired level of achievement only if the state failed to meet
the standard or the DLA in the previous reporting year.
25
As previously noted, federal law provides that the Secretary
of Labor may refuse to recertify a state, withhold payment, or
both upon a finding that the state's unemployment insurance
program fails to comply with the mandatory provisions.26 The
USDOL's regulations detail a decertification process that
begins with informal discussions with state officials, followed
by a notice of possible noncertification to the governor of that
state if discussions prove unsuccessful, and ultimately a formal
20. See id. As originally drafted, this regulation provided for a phase-in stan-
dard for 1974 requiring that a state issue 50% of first-level decisions within 30 days,
75% within 45 days, and 90% within 75 days. 37 Fed. Reg. 16,174 (1972). Thereafter,
the standard was to be 75% within 30 days and 85% within 45 days. Id. The regula-
tion was amended in 1976, setting the standard at current, lower levels of perfor-
mance. 41 Fed. Reg. 6757 (1976) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 650.4(b) (1995)).
21. 20 C.F.R. § 650.4(b).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 20 C.F.R. § 650.5 (1995).
25. See EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., US. DEP'T OF LABOR, ET HAND-
BOOK No. 336, at 1-2 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter ET HANDBOOK] (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). This CAP is submitted in
conjunction with the annual Program and Budget Plan. See id. at 1-3.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 503(b)-(c) (1994).
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hearing.27 Although there has been some oversight and
enforcement of reporting requirements, the USDOL has never
taken any action beyond informal discussions with states
regarding appeals promptness standards.2' This holds true
despite the fact that the regulations specifically state that
efforts to resolve the matter informally may continue even after
formal notification of the date and place of a hearing.2 9
In its correspondence with states, the USDOL has taken the
position that failure to meet the established numerical criteria
does not necessarily mean failure to meet the standard for
appeals promptness.3 ° Various states have raised the USDOL's
position as a defense, albeit unsuccessfully, to lawsuits filed by
legal services agencies to enforce promptness standards.
Despite the USDOL's reluctance to demand compliance with
the standards, courts have used the standards and DLAs as a
basis for granting relief.31
II. SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT OF RECESSIONARY BACKLOGS
A. The Data
Between 1989 and 1993, the unemployment compensation
system confronted some of the highest unemployment rates
since the Great Depression. Unfortunately, this system, which
was designed to help unemployed workers stay "at subsistence
levels without the necessity of... turning to welfare or private
charity," " proved wanting. A review of appeals promptness
27. 20 C.F.R. § 601.5 (1995).
28. See Gerard Hildebrand, Federal Law Requirements for the Federal-State
Unemployment Compensation System: Interpretation and Application, 29 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 527, 540 (1996).
29. See 20 C.F.R. § 601.5(b).
30. Letter from Cornelius J. Humphrey, Regional Director for Unemployment
Insurance Service, United States Department of Labor, to Robert L. Harvey,
Chairman, California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 2 (Sept. 11, 1991) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
31. E.g., Dunn v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 474 F. Supp. 269, 275-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (granting injunctive relief ordering state to comply with standards);
see also Burtton v. Johnson, 538 F.2d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 1976) (enforcing standards
regarding the initial payment of benefits). Legal services organizations in other
states have reached agreements resulting in compliance with timeliness standards.
See Ochoa v. Harvey, No. CIV-S-92-736, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 1992).
32. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 US. 121, 132 (1971).
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performance data nationwide between 1990 and 1994 demon-
strates the SESAs' continued failure to meet the first- and
second-level criteria.3
Between 1990 and 1994, only seventeen of the fifty-three
SESAs consistently met both first-level appeal standards by
issuing sixty percent of decisions within thirty days and eighty
percent within forty-five days.34 For the same period, only
sixteen of the fifty SESAs that provide second-level appeals
systems met the second-level DLAs for all five years.35 During
this critical period of time, only seven states-Alabama, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Wyoming-
managed to meet both the first-level standards and the second-
level DLAs for all five years. 3' Hawaii and Nebraska were also
in compliance with the first-level standards during all five years,
but neither of those states has a second-level appeals system.37
33. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR-
ANCE QUALITY APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 90, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35 (1990)
[hereinafter APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 90]; UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE QUALITY APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 91, at 77-78 fig.
111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35 (1991) [hereinafter APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 91]; UNEMPLOY-
MENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE QUALITY APPRAIS-
AL RESULTS FY 92, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35 (1992) [hereinafter
APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 92]; UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE QUALITY APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 93, at 77-78 fig. 111-32,
81-82 fig. 111-35 (1993) [hereinafter APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 93]; UNEMPLOYMENT INS.
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE QUALITY APPRAISAL
RESULTS FY 94, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35 (1994) [hereinafter APPRAISAL
RESULTS FY 94].
34. APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 90, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32; APPRAISAL
RESULTS FY 91, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 92, supra
note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 93, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig.
111-32; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 94, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32 (reporting that
the states consistently meeting the standards were Alabama, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming).
35. APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 90, supra note 33, at 81-82 fig. 111-35; APPRAISAL
RESULTS FY 91, supra note 33, at 81-82 fig. 111-35; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 92, supra
note 33, at 81-82 fig. 111-35; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 93, supra note 33, at 81-82 fig.
111-35; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 94, supra note 33, at 81-82 fig. 111-35 (reporting that
the states consistently meeting the DLAs were Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming).
36. APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 90, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. III-
35; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 91, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35;
APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 92, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35;
APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 93, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35;
APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 94, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35.
37. APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 90, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. III-
35; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 91, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35;
APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 92, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35;
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It is not surprising that states might fall out of compliance for
a year or so during periods of high unemployment while making
adjustments to compensate for increased workload. Noncom-
pliance has, however, proved long-lasting. Ten SESAs were out
of compliance with first-level appeal standards for five con-
secutive years from 1990 through 1994.8 Nine SESAs failed to
meet the DLAs for second-level appeals during the same five-
year period.39 Four SESAs-the District of Columbia, Michigan,
New York, and Ohio-failed to meet both first- and second-level
appeals criteria for five consecutive years.40
Anecdotal evidence indicates that states' failure to meet these
standards caused delays much more significant than the USDOL
statistics reveal. Claimants throughout the nation waited
months, and even years, for hearings on first- and second-level
appeals during this period.4
This trend did not escape the USDOL's notice. In fact, the
Appeals Promptness Performance Report for the First Quarter of
Fiscal Year 1990 noted: "The trend of increasing case inventory
and declining promptness performance, which began in early
1989, is continuing and the end of that trend is not yet in
sight."42 By the end of fiscal year 1990, pending first-level ap-
peals nationwide had increased by 24.4%; the average number
of appeals filed per month increased by 1000; and inventory at
the end of the year was 83,800, or 1.2 times the number of
decisions issued on a monthly basis.43 The report concluded:
APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 93, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35;
APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 94, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32, 81-82 fig. 111-35.
38. APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 90, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32; APPRAISAL
RESULTS FY 91, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 92, supra
note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 93, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig.
111-32; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 94, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32 (noting that those
SESAs failing to meet first-level appeals standards were Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Puerto
Rico, and Wisconsin).
39. APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 90, supra note 33, at 81-82 fig. 111-35; APPRAISAL
RESULTS FY 91, supra note 33, at 81-82 fig. 111-35; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 92, supra
note 33, at 81-82 fig. 111-35; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 93, supra note 33, at 81-82 fig.
111-35; APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 94, supra note 33, at 81-82 fig. 111-35 (noting that those
SESAs failing to meet second-level appeals DLAs were Arizona, California, Colorado,
District of Columbia, Idaho, Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania).
40. See infra Appendix I, Appendix II.
41. See discussion infra Part II.B.
42. See UIS Information Bulletin, Appeals Promptness Performance Report for
First Quarter of Fiscal Year 1990, at 2 (unnumbered, n.d.) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
43. UIS Information Bulletin No. 11-91, Appeals Promptness Performance Report
for Fiscal Year 1990, at 2 (Apr. 26, 1991) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
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"The States will have to take decisive action and commit
considerable resources to improve promptness performance
during FY 1991."
44
During fiscal year 1991, eighteen SESAs failed to meet first-
level appeal standards.45 Twenty-eight were out of compliance
during fiscal year 1992.46 A staggering 285,500 first-level
appeals were filed during the second quarter of fiscal year
1992.4' The inventory of pending first-level appeals was at an
all-time high of 145,100, 1.6 times the number of decisions
issued on a monthly basis.4' This represented an increase of
31.4% from the second quarter of fiscal year 199149 and was
double the pending inventory for 1989.5o The second quarter
report noted that these figures did not factor in the more than
9000 appeals from Emergency Unemployment Compensation 5'
claims pending at the end of the quarter.52
Available data indicate that first-level appeals filings declined
in the third quarter of fiscal year 1992"3 and then fluctuated
between 251,000 and 274,000 through the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 1994.54 Pending first-level appeals dropped to 89,200
44. Id.
45. APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 91, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32.
46. APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 92, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32.
47. UIS Information Bulletin No. 12-92, Appeals Promptness Performance Report
for Second Quarter of Fiscal Year 1992, at 5 (June 29, 1992) (on file with the Universi-
ty of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 5.
50. See UIS Information Bulletin, supra note 42, at 5.
51. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-164,
105 Stat. 1049 (codified at scattered sections of 5, 20, 26, 42 and 45 U.S.C. (1994)).
52. UIS Information Bulletin No. 12-92, supra note 47, at 1.
53. UIS Information Bulletin No. 21-92, Appeals Promptness Performance Report
for the Third Quarter of Fiscal Year 1992, at 1 (Sept. 28, 1992) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting 268,700 appeals filed during
third quarter).
54. UIS Information Bulletin No. 05-93, Appeals Promptness Performance and
Workload Reports for Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 1992 and Fiscal Year 1992, at 5
(Dec. 7, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (report-
ing 274,700 appeals filed during fourth quarter); UIS Information Bulletin No. 09-93,
Appeals Promptness Performance and Workload Reports for First Quarter Fiscal Year
1993, at 5 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting
259,200 appeals filed during first quarter); UIS Information Bulletin No. 18-93,
Appeals Promptness Performance and Workload Reports for Second Quarter of Fiscal
Year 1993, at 5 (July 14, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) (reporting 259,600 appeals filed during second quarter); UIS Information
Bulletin No. 23-93, Appeals Promptness Performance and Workload Report for Third
Quarter of Fiscal Year 1993, at 5 (Aug. 13, 1993) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting 253,800 appeals filed during the third
quarter); UIS Information Bulletin No. 2-94, Appeals Promptness Performance and
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by the end of the third quarter of fiscal year 1994. 55 Concur-
rently, the number of states meeting first-level performance
standards increased.16 By the end of fiscal year 1994, however,
there were still twenty-one states out of compliance with first-
level appeal standards.57
The problem of noncompliance with the DLAs for second-level
appeals has been equally persistent. At the end of the first
quarter of fiscal year 1990, the USDOL noted that although the
number of second-level appeals had declined slightly from the
previous quarter, the number of decisions had declined even
more, resulting in 24,500 pending cases-an increase of 2200
cases from the previous quarter.58 The report concluded, "This
is a serious negative indicator for good promptness performance
in the coming months."59
Pending inventory of second-level appeals increased to 25,987
by the end of fiscal year 1990, which was 2.4 times the average
number of appeals decided per month.60 The report noted, "As
with lower authority appeals, the States will have to take
decisive action and commit considerable resources to improve
Workload Reports for Fourth Quarter of Fiscal Year 1993 and Fiscal Year 1993, at
6 (Nov. 19, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(reporting 251,200 appeals filed during the fourth quarter); UIS Information Bulletin
No. 18-94, Appeals Promptness Performance and Workload Reports for Third Quarter
of Fiscal Year 1994, at 5 (Sept. 2, 1994) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (reporting 253,600 appeals filed during the third quarter);
UIS Information Bulletin No. 5-95, Appeals Promptness Performance and Workload
Reports for Fourth Quarter of Fiscal Year 1994 and Fiscal Year 1994, at 5 (Dec. 6,
1994) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting
255,500 appeals filed during the fourth quarter).
55. UIS Information Bulletin No. 5-95, supra note 54, at 5.
56. See UIS Information Bulletin No. 21-92, supra note 53, at 2 (29 states did not
meet 30-day criterion; 25 states did not meet 45-day criterion); UIS Information
Bulletin No. 09-93, supra note 54, at 1, 2 (27 states did not meet 30-day criterion; 21
states did not meet 45-day criterion); UIS Information Bulletin No. 18-93, supra note
54, at 1, 2 (23 states did not meet 30-day criterion; 18 states did not meet 45-day
criterion); UIS Information Bulletin No. 23-93, supra note 54, at 1, 2 (19 states did
not meet 30-day criterion; 20 states did not meet 45-day criterion); UIS Information
Bulletin No. 2-94, supra note 54, at 1, 2 (21 states did not meet 30-day criterion; 14
states did not meet 45-day criterion); UIS Information Bulletin No. 18-94, supra note
54, at 1, 2 (14 states did not meet 30-day criterion; 8 states did not meet 45-day
criterion); UIS Information Bulletin No. 5-95, supra note 54, at 1, 3 (13 states did not
meet 30-day criterion; 14 states did not meet 45-day criterion).
57. APPRAIsAL REsuLTs FY 94, supra note 33, at 77-78 fig. 111-32.
58. UIS Information Bulletin, supra note 42, at 3.
59. Id.
60. UIS Information Bulletin No. 11-91, supra note 43, at 4.
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promptness performance during FY 1991. "61 This admonition
had little effect as the number of pending second-level appeals
peaked at 44,900 in the first quarter of 1993.62 Twenty-three
states failed to meet the DLAs during this quarter.6 3
The second-level appeals backlog improved somewhat by the
end of fiscal year 1993: although almost half of the states were
still out of compliance with one or both of the DLAs for the
fourth quarter of 1993, the number of appeals pending at that
level decreased to 41,500.64 The situation continued to improve
slowly, and by end of fiscal year 1994, twenty-one states were
out of compliance, and the number of appeals pending dropped
to 39,000.65 Recent data indicate that twelve states failed to
meet either the forty-five day DLA, or the seventy-five day DLA,
or both, for second-level appeals in November 1994.66 Despite
this improvement, as Appendix I illustrates, several large states
continue to be unable to achieve compliance with second-level
appeals performance goals.
B. Backlog Causes
In its explanations for widespread appeals backlogs and
noncompliance with the timeliness standards and DLAs over the
past several years, the USDOL has focused on states' difficulties
with adjusting to the increased numbers of filed appeals.6 7 While
increased workload provides one reason for the poor performance
on appeals promptness across the nation, it is not the only cause
that legal services attorneys involved in litigation and adminis-
61. Id.
62. UIS Information Bulletin No. 09-93, supra note 54, at 4.
63. Id. at 3-4.
64. UIS Information Bulletin No. 2-94, supra note 54, at 3-4.
65. UIS Information Bulletin No. 5-95, supra note 54, at 3.
66. ETA 5-130 Monthly Report for November 1994 (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
67. See Actions to Consider with Respect to NELP's Recommendations 4 (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (internal USDOL document
prompted by the National Employment Law Project's publishing of a Briefing Book
regarding USDOL oversight and reform of the unemployment compensation system);
see also Mary Ann Wyrsch, Director, Unemployment Ins. Serv., U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Appeals: The Federal Perspective, NAUIAB NEWS (National Ass'n of Unemployment
Ins. Appellate Bds., Phoenix, Ariz.), Mar. 1994, at 1-2 [hereinafter Appeals: The
Federal Perspective].
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trative advocacy have identified.6 s Nor is it the only cause that
states identify when explaining the backlogs.69 Finally, it clearly
cannot explain the significant number of states still out of
compliance, given that the number of new appeals has de-
creased.
In fact, a state's historic ability to meet timeliness standards,
rather than the percentage increase in workload, more directly
correlated to whether a state fell out of compliance during the
recession. Consider the different effects of increased workload
on two state systems of comparable size, Texas and New York.
In 1990, Texas was in compliance and had an annual workload
of 58,261 first-level appeals and 11,942 second-level appeals.70
That same year, New York was out of compliance with all four
measures for first- and second-level appeals and had a workload
of 48,326 first-level appeals and 9549 second-level appeals."
Both states suffered comparable increases in first-level appeals
over the next four years.72 Yet, during these increases, Texas
managed to comply for thirty-four of the fifty-nine months, while
New York met compliance standards for first-level appeals for
only ten of those months.73
As discussed below, numerous factors have contributed to
appeals promptness problems, including the lack of effective
oversight of state programs by the USDOL.
1. Increased Numbers of Appeals-Between 1989 and 1993,
the average number of new first-level appeals per month for all
states increased by nearly 50% from 63,000 to 94,000.74 The
68. In a pre-recession study of the "best practices" of several states in compliance
with the appeals promptness goals, the USDOL reported a consensus among the
project participants that workload size alone is not determinative of whether a state
would achieve promptness. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEM-
PLOYMENT INSURANCE OCCASIONAL PAPER 89-7, LEADERSHIP IN APPELLATE ADMINIS-
TRATION: SUCCESSFUL STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPELLATE OPERATIONS 3
(1989) [hereinafter LEADERSHIP IN APPELLATE ADMINISTRATION].
69. The corrective action plans submitted by various states from 1990 to 1994
identify factors such as staffing, staff training, automation problems, and transcription
problems, among other administrative issues. See, e.g., Michigan FY 1992 Corrective
Action Plan Narrative (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(reporting various problems in the administrative framework).
70. ETA 5-130 Yearly Report, 1990 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
71. Id.
72. Texas had 61,910 in 1991, 77,887 in 1992, 70,476 in 1993, and 63,903 in 1994
(through November). New York had 57,676 in 1991, 60835 in 1992, 62,048 in 1993,
and 51753 in 1994 (through November). ETA 5-130 Yearly Reports, 1991-1994 (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
73. ETA Monthly Reports, January 1990-November 1994 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
74. Appeals: The Federal Perspective, supra note 67, at 1-2.
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increase in appeals filed, however, was dramatically outpaced
by the increasing backlog of pending first-level appeals, which
doubled between 1989 to 1992.75 Similarly, the average num-
ber of second-level appeals filings increased significantly
during this period.76 Unlike first-level appeals, which peaked
in fiscal year 1992, the average number of new second-level
filings continued to increase through the end of fiscal year
1993, increasing more than 70% from fiscal year 1989. 77
Although the inventory of second-level appeals decreased
slightly in fiscal year 1993, it was still more than double the
level at the beginning of fiscal year 1989.78 Here, too, a direct
relationship existed between the numbers of new filings and
the inventory increase, although the growth of the latter
outpaced that of the former.7 9
These raw numbers do not, however, tell the whole story,
because they do not explain the reasons for the increase in
appeals. The increase in appeals undoubtedly reflects claim-
ants' anxieties about the difficulty of finding new suitable
employment during a sluggish economy, as well as employers'
concerns about the effect of workforce reductions on their
experience ratings0 and their greater sensitivity during a
recession to the financial bottom line. Another factor was the
passage of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
program,8' which added a significant number of appeals to
already overburdened systems.8 2 In short, multiple factors
75. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
76. See Appeals: The Federal Perspective, supra note 67, at 1-2.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2.
79. See supra Part II.A. A similar relationship between numbers of second-level
appeals and pending inventory, with inventory growing more rapidly than numbers
of new appeals, was noted in an analysis of data from the 1970s. Robert I. Owen &
Edward A. Wood, Timeliness in Deciding Second-Level Appeals, in 3 UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION: STUDIES AND RESEARCH 643, 647 (National Comm'n on Unemploy-
ment Compensation ed., 1980).
80. Experience rating is an index of an employer's history of employee layoffs or
terminations resulting in the payment of unemployment compensation benefits. The
higher the experience rating of an employer, the higher the tax rate that such an
employer must contribute to the state's unemployment trust fund. ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 88-89
(1994).
81. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-164,
105 Stat. 1049 (codified at scattered sections of 5, 20, 26, 42 and 45 U.S.C. (1994)).
82. Information from the ETA forms submitted regarding Emergency Unemploy-
ment Compensation (EUC) indicates that 62,487 EUC appeals were filed in fiscal
year 1992 and another 106,563 were filed in fiscal year 1993. See Facsimile from
Cynthia L. Ambler, Unemployment Insurance Service, United States Department of
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combined to increase the number of appeals, contributing to
the appeals backlogs.
2. Changes in Claims Processing at Initial Claims Lev-
el-Appellate authorities were not alone in feeling the burdens
of an increased number of filings. Increased volume has also
slowed initial claims processing, leading to shortcuts in pro-
cedures. Examiners might decide claims solely by telephone
contacts or without obtaining documentation on determinative
issues. For example, the examiner might not request that an
employer provide records verifying absences that allegedly
violate its progressive disciplinary policy for attendance.83
Procedures normally used to correct faulty initial determina-
tions, such as pre-appeal reviews, may be eliminated.
The consequences of such changes at the initial decision-
making level are twofold. First, the quality of the determina-
tions decreases because decisions are made on less trustworthy
information, and because corrective safeguards which would
otherwise protect the quality of determinations have been
eliminated. Second, the party that does not prevail in the
initial determination is more likely to be dissatisfied with the
result if it appears to be poorly supported.84 As a result, the
number of appeals likely will increase, exacerbating appeals
promptness. problems.
3. State Government Hiring Freezes-The USDOL indicates
that appeals backlogs develop because states are often unable
to increase their appeals staff quickly enough to respond to
increased demand because of the time required to recruit, hire,
Labor, to Sue McNeill, Staff Attorney, National Employment Law Project (Mar. 16,
1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
83. A progressive disciplinary policy for attendance is a common system in which
employers impose escalating penalties for successive violations of the policy, usually
ending in job termination. For instance, a common progressive disciplinary policy
might provide that a worker is orally warned for the first unexcused absence, receives
a written warning for a second such absence, receives a three-day suspension for the
third, and is terminated for the fourth. Often, progressive disciplinary policies for
attendance are "no fault,' meaning that the worker will be subject to the indicated
sanction no matter what the reason for the absence.
84. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board made such a case
to the USDOL during a 1991 on-site compliance visit. The USDOL representative
remarked in his notes that further study would shed light on the validity of this
assertion. There is no evidence in records released by the USDOL that any follow-up
study or evaluation took place. See Memorandum to file of Daniel P. Riordan, Legisla-
tive Liaison, Employment & Training Administration, United States Department of
Labor, at 3-4 (July 17, 1991) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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and train appeals staff.85 In our experience, however, state
politics also play a role in this delay.
During recessionary periods, state governments commonly
institute personnel hiring freezes. This results from shrinking
state tax receipts, caused by the decreased business activity
and employment. But in addition to the reality of limited state
resources, state hiring freezes are often political signals meant
to reassure voters that their taxes are not being squandered
during a tense economic period. On numerous occasions, the
USDOL has identified statewide hiring freezes as an impedi-
ment to efforts to comply with the promptness goals. 6
Unfortunately, because both emanate from recession, these
hiring freezes occur at the same time that activity in the
unemployment compensation systems swells.
Thus, at the very time that the need for additional appeals
personnel grows, political forces militate against meeting that
need. This holds true despite the fact that administrative costs
are reimbursed by the federal government,87 and despite
special federal grants that were available to states with
85. Actions to Consider with Respect to NELP's Recommendations, supra note
67, at 4.
86. For example, in its monitoring of Nevada's first-level appeals timeliness
difficulties, the USDOL concluded that the state's fiscal problems and resulting hiring
freeze had prevented reduction of the backlog of cases. Letter from Don A. Balcer,
Regional Administrator, United States Department of Labor, to Stanley P. Jones,
Executive Director, Nevada Employment Security Department 2 (May 21, 1992) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Additionally, the correc-
tive action plans of Missouri and Arizona both indicated that their failure to meet the
standards stemmed in part from a hiring freeze or personnel budget constraints. See,
e.g., Arizona FY 1992 Corrective Action Plan Narrative (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting state's unsuccessful attempt to obtain
federal funding for hiring temporary personnel); Memorandum from Hannelore D.
Fischer, Chairman, Labor and Industrial Relations Committee, Missouri Department
of Labor and Industrial Relations, to Tom Deuschle, Director, Division of Employment
Security (July 30, 1991) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) (reporting state's failure to meet criteria caused by lack of sufficient legal
staff). The USDOL's pre-recession study of successful appellate operations also cited
state hiring freezes as an excuse offered for noncompliance. LEADERSHIP IN APPELLATE
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 68, at 5.
87. As explained in Part I, the federal employer payroll tax established by FUTA
is the funding source for the state programs' administrative costs, including those for
operation of their appeals systems. The USDOL allocates this funding to the states
according to their estimated workload and to their actual cost of processing. Separate
allocations are made for personnel services, which include employee compensation,
and for nonpersonnel services, which include rent, supplies, and contracted services.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIHRD-89-72BR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: AD-
MINISTRATIVE FUNDING IS A GROWING PROBLEM FOR STATE PROGRAMS 10-11 (1989)
[hereinafter UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: ADMINISTRATIVE FUNDING].
Timeliness in Appeals
252 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:1&2
additional staffing needs because of severe backlogs.88 One
reason for this apparent inconsistency is that the states
increasingly have found their federal administrative grants to
be inadequate.89 In addition, a significant lag period between
an increase in a state's workload and an increase in its federal
administrative funding means that salaries for new personnel
compete with all of the other demands for scarce state re-
sources. Because of these dynamics, states are unlikely to be
able to increase their staffs to keep pace with the increased
number of appeals, even if they are inclined to do so, unless
they are subjected to external pressures, such as USDOL
oversight or lawsuits.
4. Deficiencies in Existing Federal Timeliness Stan-
dards-The USDOL's performance measurements for appeals
promptness contain several flaws that have contributed di-
rectly to the development of backlogs. The most obvious flaw
is that there are still no federal regulations governing the
timeliness of second-level appeals. The DLAs are simply not
as effective, because they do not quantify legal or regulatory
standards and do not carry explicit regulatory sanctions.9 °
Given the DLAs' lesser effectiveness, states have been less
motivated to comply with them, and the USDOL has had less
leverage to deal with second-level appeals backlogs. Moreover,
legal services advocates may face a more difficult time estab-
lishing that states violate the "when due" provision of federal
law,9 because courts may not view failure to comply with the
DLAs as an indication of violation of the statute.
A less evident deficiency of the timeliness standards lies in
the measurement of timeliness by reference to the number of
appeals decisions issued rather than the number of cases
pending. This methodology permits a state to appear to be
deciding cases in a timely fashion, when it in fact could have
a substantial inventory of old, undecided appeals. It also
means that the timeliness standards are not violated as soon
88. See ET HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 1-4.
89. In an effort to help remedy this problem, contingency funds were made
available in fiscal year 1992 and continued in fiscal year 1993 to compensate for
unanticipated administrative costs caused by increased appeals workload. Id.
90. See SESA Performance Enhancement Work-group, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Toward a New System for Enhancing Unemployment Insurance Performance 11 (Apr.
11, 1994) [hereinafter Performance Enhancement Design Workpaper] (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1994).
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as a state begins to fall behind in its workload, but only after
it starts resolving the backlog. This built-in lag period pre-
vents prompt efforts by concerned parties to address the
problem before it escalates. 92
Consequently, when a state begins to make progress in
eliminating a backlog, its timeliness performance looks very
poor because it is resolving a high number of older appeals.
This situation becomes particularly acute if the state attempts
to resolve its backlog in the order that the appeals were filed
because few decisions will fall within the thirty- and forty-five-
day categories. 93 This phenomenon operates as a disincentive
for a state to confront its oldest cases. Instead, it may manipu-
late its caseload in an attempt to improve its compliance with
the standards. Rather than deciding cases in chronological
order, a state may focus on more recently filed appeals in
order to maximize the number of cases decided in the thirty-
and forty-five-day periods. 94 Neither the federal regulations
92. The Pennsylvania experience illustrates the current methodology's weakness.
Legal services advocates began noting anecdotally in late summer or early fall of
1991 that their clients were waiting much longer for their first-level hearings to be
scheduled and for decisions to be rendered. Pennsylvania's reported performance for
first-level decisions rendered within 30 days, however, did not fall below the 60%
benchmark until December 1991. Compare ETA 5-130 Report of Pennsylvania, July
1991 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) and ETA 5-130
Report of Pennsylvania, August 1991 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform) and ETA 5-130 Report of Pennsylvania, September 1991 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) and ETA 5-130 Report of
Pennsylvania, October 1991 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) and ETA 5-130 Report of Pennsylvania, November 1991 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) with ETA 5-130 Report of Pennsylva-
nia, December 1991 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
Because of the time lag in reporting the data, these figures for December 1991 did
not become available until mid-January 1992. ETA 5-130 Report of Pennsylvania,
December 1991, supra. Meanwhile, the number of pending first-level appeals had in-
creased from 3780 at the end of July 1991, to 5235 by the end of December 1991. ETA
5-130 Report of Pennsylvania, July 1991, supra; ETA 5-130 Report of Pennsylvania,
December 1991, supra. Thus, the evidence that could have supported the filing of a
Pennsylvania lawsuit to force compliance with the "when due" clause did not exist
until after the problem was already well under way.
93. For example, the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board of Review agreed,
after litigation, to handle cases in the order in which they were filed. NATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT INC., BRIEFING BOOK: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OVERSIGHT AND REFORM OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM 7 n.8
(1994) [hereinafter NELP BRIEFING BOOK]. By October 1, 1993, the state had reduced
its inventory from 9500 cases in the prior year to 2800 pending appeals. Id. Rather
than reflecting this turnaround, however, the regulatory measure demonstrated that
the SESA had decided 0.72% of appeals in 30 days, and 6.16% in 45 days. Id.
94. This observation is not merely the manifestation of suspicious minds. The
Interim Report of the USDOL's Performance Measurement Review project states that
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governing first-level appeals nor the DLAs for second-level
appeals require that cases be decided on a first-in-first-out
basis.
Because some states' second-level appeals systems employ
discretionary review, manipulation of the DLAs has been
especially effective for states seeking to conceal a timeliness
problem.95 In Ohio, for example, the Board of Review's statis-
tics for second-level appeals indicated laudable efficiency: 50
to 60% of cases were decided within forty-five days, and 80 to
85% were resolved within seventy-five days.96 The Board was
able to achieve these numbers by using a two-step decision-
making process, in which its first step was to deny discretion-
ary review of a large number of cases promptly.97 Cases that
survived to the second step for review on the merits, i.e. the
arguably meritorious appeals, experienced delays of two to
three years.98 But when Ohio combined the statistics for
disposition of both denials of discretionary reviews and deci-
sions on the merits after discretionary reviews, a finding of
overall compliance resulted, even though virtually no claimant
benefited by such "timeliness."99 A similar scenario occurred in
Massachusetts with the same result. 100
C. The USDOL's Oversight Efforts and
the Correction of Backlogs
As discussed in Part I, federal law assigns the responsibility
of overseeing the states' appeals promptness to the USDOL.
California Appeals staff admitted the occurrence of this sort of manipulation in the
scheduling of hearings. The Report notes the "perverse affect [sic] on claimant rights,
because some claimants are victimized by the performance measurement approach."
William S. Borden & Walter S. Corson, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Perfor-
mance Measurement Review Interim Evaluation Report 54 (Dec. 5, 1994) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Moreover, in its 1991 corrective
action plan, Wisconsin explained, that its poor timeliness performance statistics
resulted when it finally addressed its backlog and stopped using this approach. See
Wisconsin FY 1991 Corrective Action Plan Narrative (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).





100. Id. at 7.
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Unfortunately, the USDOL's responses to the significant ap-
peals backlogs that developed during the recessionary years of
the early 1990s could be characterized as too little, too late.
In its 1989 review of the administrative funding system, the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that the
USDOL had diminished its oversight capacity by reducing the
amount of data it collects, reducing staffing in its regional
offices, and increasing the authority of state programs. 1°1 The
GAO observed: "[Tihe change in [the USDOL's] monitoring
role raises questions as to how quickly service quality prob-
lems can be identified by [the USDOLI should they arise and
whether the expertise at the regional level will be available to
deal with such problems as in the past." °2 This observation
proved prescient when timeliness problems developed during
the early 1990s.
1. Inadequate and Untimely Warnings and Punitive Ac-
tions-With the development of first-level appeals backlogs,
one might have expected the USDOL to notify states promptly
about problems. The rapidity with which large backlogs were
developing seemingly would have suggested cause for alarm
and would have inspired immediate attention to the problem.
To be sure, the USDOL must have been aware of warnings
from state program officials that serious disruptions in service
would likely occur should unemployment suddenly increase," 3
which should have alerted the USDOL to monitor this situa-
tion as claims increased.
Nevertheless, state programs apparently sometimes heard
from legal services advocates long before they heard from the
USDOL.' °4 Moreover, the content of correspondence between
101. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: ADMINISTRATIVE FUNDING, supra note 87, at 4,
42-44.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 2, 33.
104. E.g., compare Letter from Sharon M. Dietrich, Staff Attorney, Community
Legal Services, to Sandra Christianson, Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Department of
Labor and Industry, and to Clifford F. Blaze, Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Unemploy-
ment Compensation Board of Review 1 (Nov. 25, 1991) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) and Letter from Sharon M. Dietrich, Community
Legal Services, to Susan Shinkman, Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Department of
Labor and Industry 1 (Apr. 15, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform) and Letter from Sharon M. Dietrich, Community Legal Services, to
Susan Shinkman, Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry
1 (June 26, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
with Letter from William J. Haltigan, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, Region III, United States Department of Labor, to Robert
N. Grant, Pennsylvania Deputy Secretary for Employment Services and Job Training
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the USDOL and the states on the appeals delays was less
forceful than one would expect.' Serious threats of sanctions
were rare.
10 6
Pennsylvania provides an example. In January 1993, legal
services advocates submitted a request under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) to the USDOL for the purpose of
learning to what extent the USDOL had monitored and at-
tempted to rectify the state's severe problems with appeals
promptness.' 7 In response to a request for all correspondence
between the state and federal governments concerning compli-
ance with the timeliness requirements, the USDOL produced
a single form letter.' By that time, Pennsylvania had been
out of compliance for first-level appeals for eight months, 10 9
and its number of pending cases had risen from less than 4000
prior to the recession to more than 9000 that month." 0 The
letter indicated that as of May 1992, thirty states were out of
compliance with the thirty-day benchmark of 60%, with the
national average at 39%.111 In Pennsylvania, the figure was
27.3%.112 The two-page letter briefly described some ideas for
improving performance and encouraged the state to examine
them. Despite these startling figures indicating widespread
noncompliance throughout the country, and Pennsylvania's
poor performance in particular, the USDOL apparently had no
further communication with the state during the five-month
1 (Aug. 21, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) and
Letter from Sammie E. Bryant, Director, Unemployment Insurance Services, Employ-
ment and Training Administration, United States Department of Labor, to Thomas
L. Simon, Chairman, Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
and to John E. Eckert, Supervisor of Referees, Pennsylvania Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review 1 (Aug. 21, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
105. See Letter from William J. Haltigan to Robert N. Grant, supra note 104, at
1 (acknowledging improved compliance).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 131-35.
107. Letter from Sharon M. Dietrich, Staff Attorney, Community Legal Services,
to William J. Haltigan, Regional Administrator, Employment and Training Adminis-
tration, Region III, United States Department of Labor 1-2 (Jan. 20, 1993) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
108. Letter from William J. Haltigan to Robert N. Grant, supra note 104, at 1-3.
109. See ETA 5-130 Reports of Pennsylvania, December 1991-July 1992 (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
110. Compare ETA 5-130 Report of Pennsylvania, July 1991, supra note 92 with
ETA 5-130 Report of Pennsylvania, August 1992 (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
111. Letter from William J. Haltigan to Robert N. Grant, supra note 104, at 1.
112. Id.
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period between the form letter and its response to the FOIA
request in February 1993.
Despite more direct involvement by the USDOL in Califor-
nia's appeals promptness problems, its enforcement efforts
were equally unsatisfactory. California started experiencing
serious increases in claims filings and first-level appeals in
1990113 and fell below compliance standards for first-level ap-
peals in July 1990.114 The year-end inventory of pending
claims was 19,053, representing an increase of 99.9% from
1989.115 Pending second-level appeals rose at a less dramatic
but equally steady pace.116 Contemporaneously, legal services
advocates noticed delays in the scheduling of first-level appeal
hearings and in second-level appeals.1 7
Although the monthly reports submitted to the USDOL
charted the swift downward trend in appeals promptness, the
USDOL's only actions were to note the trend and to seek some
additional information informally. In July 1991, after receiving
a FOIA request from California Rural Legal Assistance for
information on appeals timeliness, the USDOL scheduled an
on-site meeting with the California Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board (CUIAB). At that July 11, 1991 meeting, the
CUIAB made representations about anticipated filings and
dispositions, which the USDOL accepted without independent
evaluation. The USDOL never set or demanded performance
standards or time goals for achievement of the critical steps
necessary to reduce the delays.
The USDOL did take a formal position on California's
compliance in 1991; however, far from threatening sanctions
or suggesting more aggressive or alternative approaches, the
USDOL undercut stronger efforts of legal services advocates
who were pressing for an adequate CUIAB response to the
113. California MA 5-130 Reports for January 1990-December 1990 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (showing number of appeals filed
between 9682 in February and 12,206 in October).
114. ETA 5-130 Report, July 1990 (on file with University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
115. Compare California MA 5-130 Report for December 1989 (9236 cases pending)
with California MA 5-130 Report for December 1990 (18,463 cases pending) (both on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
116. The number of pending second-level appeals increased from 1456 in January
1990 to 1842 in December, peaking at 2014 in September. California MA 5-130
Reports for January 1990-December 1990 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
117. Cynthia Rice was involved in all these steps. The assertions here are based
on her personal experience.
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problem.'18 Two days after the Legal Aid Society of Alameda
County and California Rural Legal Assistance warned the
CUIAB of a possible suit on the timeliness issue, the USDOL
faxed a letter to the CUIAB, noting the CUIAB's weak efforts
in July to increase caseload assignments and to increase
staffing by approximately twenty-one judges." 9 The letter
concluded: "In our opinion, California does meet the [unem-
ployment insurance] appeals promptness standard at this
time, and no compliance issues are currently presented by the
State's performance shortfall." 2 °
At the time the USDOL proclaimed California's "compli-
ance," the most recent report of appeals promptness data, from
July 1991, showed that California's percentage of cases re-
solved in a timely manner had fallen by nearly ten percentage
points, 2' and that the total backlog of appeals had increased
by nearly 4% in just one month.'22 The August report, complet-
ed less than a week after the USDOL's proclamation, showed
that California's backlog of first-level unemployment appeals
had reached 35,345 and that the number of new appeals filed
had climbed to 14,568.123 During that month, California was
able to resolve only 18.9% of those cases within forty-five days,
compared to the federal standard of 80%.124
In September 1991, California submitted a corrective action
plan (CAP) for first-level appeals for fiscal year 1992. At that
time, California was resolving only 9.0% of its first-level
appeals within thirty days and only 19.2% within forty-five
days.125 The plan included the goal of implementing an en-
hanced automation system, which had been slated for replace-
ment in 1991 under the terms of the state's fiscal year 1990
118. Letter from Cornelius J. Humphrey to Robert L. Harvey, supra note 30, at
3-4.
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id. at 1.
121. This includes both first- and second-level appeals. Second-level appeal
timeliness was especially bad, falling from 72.0% timely disposition to 45.6%. See
California MA 5-130 Reports for June 1991 and July 1991 (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
122. See California MA 5-130 Reports for June 1991 and July 1991 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
123. California MA 5-130 Report for August 1991 (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
124. Id.
125. See California MA 5-130 Report for September 1991 (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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CAP.126 The 1992 CAP did not acknowledge the state's failure
to meet the previous goal. 127 Although the 1992 CAP men-
tioned increased staffing, it fixed no staffing levels nor hiring
completion dates. The CAP also did not establish a schedule
for achieving compliance with timeliness standards. 2 The
CAP for second-level appeals suffered from the same lack of
accountability. Nevertheless, the USDOL approved this CAP.
During negotiations between legal services advocates and
the CUIAB,129 it became clear that much of the state's plan
was premised on the hope, unsubstantiated by reliable indi-
cators, that initial claims and appeals would drop off and that
the problem would resolve itself. The USDOL uncritically
echoed this perspective in accepting the corrective action
plans. In fact, far more than twenty-one new judges were
needed to overcome the delays suffered by California claim-
ants. After a year of negotiations and the filing of a federal
lawsuit by legal services advocates, 3 ° the CUIAB increased its
staff of administrative law judges assigned to first-level ap-
peals from 125 to more than 200; only then was the state able
to resolve the backlog and come into compliance for first-level
appeals by December 1992. California has yet to comply with
the DLAs for second-level appeals.
2. No Effect on Recertification-As noted previously, fed-
eral law prohibits the Secretary of Labor from recertifying a
state for payment of administrative expenses unless the state
manages its appeals program in compliance with the "when
due" mandate.' 3' This sanction would not only eliminate the
state unemployment insurance system's administrative
funding, but it would also deprive employers of the credit
against federal unemployment taxes." 2 Despite this statutory
directive and the severe appeals timeliness problems in many
states, apparently no state's recertification was even ques-
tioned, and the USDOL held no formal hearings on recertifi-
cation. 13
126. See California FY 1992 Corrective Action Plan (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Cynthia Rice participated in these negotiations.
130. Ochoa v. Harvey, No. CIV-S-92 736 (E.D. Cal. filed May 8, 1992).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1994); see also supra text accompanying notes
17-20 (discussing the USDOL's interpretation of the "when due" requirement).
132. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
133. In all the documents received in response to the four FOIA requests, there
were no notices of formal hearing.
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Nor is there any evidence that the USDOL took the initial
formal step of notifying the states' governors that there ap-
peared to be compliance issues, as regulations require. 134 All
communication produced by the USDOL in response to the
various FOIA requests was directed to the states' agency staff.
In light of the USDOL's failure even to raise the issue, is there
any wonder that states have not taken this potential sanction
seriously?
3. No Independent Monitoring of the States'Problems-The
USDOL's oversight generally did not involve any independent
analysis of the causes of a state's backlog. Nor did the USDOL
itself attempt to project the number of future appeals a state
could anticipate, which affects the effectiveness of its efforts
to eliminate the backlog as quickly as possible.
The USDOL's reliance on the states' explanations of these
matters suffers from two problems. First, because the states
were already out of compliance with federal law, the objectiv-
ity of their analysis is inherently questionable. Second, as the
federal agency responsible for overseeing the unemployment
compensation program, the USDOL should gather independent
data regarding such issues.
4. Inadequate and Ineffective Corrective Action Plans and
Appeals Performance Plans-When a state has been out of
compliance with a timeliness standard, the USDOL typically
requires the state to submit a corrective action plan.1 35 The
USDOL indicates that it views CAPs as a primary mechanism
of its enforcement strategy. 136 Even the USDOL recognizes,
however, that "many [states] have failed to achieve [the] DLAs
despite years of repeated CAPs." 137 This is certainly true in the
appeals promptness context.
An examination of submitted CAPs suggests that the gen-
eral lack of improvement is less surprising. The CAPs are
often extremely short on detail, and sometimes states submit
CAPs identical to the year before, despite a lack of compliance
134. See 20 C.F.R. § 601.5(c) (1995).
135. Rarely are states specifically told to complete a CAP. In most instances, it
appears that states themselves determine whether a CAP must be submitted for
failure to comply with a standard or DLA, resulting in less-than-perfect compliance.
A CAP is presented in conjunction with the submission of a state's annual Unemploy-
ment Insurance Program Budget Plan.
136. See Performance Enhancement Design Workpaper, supra note 90, at 15.
137. Id.
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in the intervening year. 3 Nevertheless, such CAPs are rou-
tinely accepted and approved by the USDOL.
In addition, the appeals promptness regulations provide that
states submit "appeals performance plans" on an annual basis.
139
Nevertheless, at least two regions have indicated that states are
not required to submit appeals performance plans if they have
complied with the timeliness standards the previous year,
despite the lack of any such exception in the regulation. 4 °
Similarly, when a state has achieved an annual average that
meets appeals promptness standards, it is permitted to omit an
analysis of appeals promptness from its annual quality appraisal
review, even though a problem may have developed recently.''
Finally, the USDOL's record is replete with examples of states
that fail to meet the appeals promptness standards year after
year.'42 Yet sanctions for such recidivism appear to be rare or
non-existent. Given its current consideration of "intermediate"
steps between requiring CAPs and threatening to deny recertifi-
cation, the USDOL seems to recognize the need to improve its
performance as to such repeated non-compliance.
138. For example, Pennsylvania has been out of compliance with the DLAs for
second-level appeals since at least fiscal year 1990. See ETA 5-130 Reports for Penn-
sylvania, October 1989-September 1990 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). Nevertheless, its appeal performance plan for fiscal year
1991 contained no thoughtful discussion about how it would correct this deficiency;
rather the plan consisted of responses typed on a two-page form, in which one- and
two-sentence goals were stated. Pennsylvania Corrective Action Plan for Appeals
Promptness for Higher Authority, Fiscal Year 1991, at 1-2 (Dec. 31, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Pennsylvania CAP FY 1991]) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform). Despite the lack of substance in the fiscal year 1991 CAP and the fact
that Pennsylvania was out of compliance again in fiscal year 1991, the USDOL ap-
proved a virtually identical appeal performance plan for fiscal year 1992. Compare
Pennsylvania CAP FY 1991, supra, with Pennsylvania Corrective Action Plan for Ap-
peals Promptness for Higher Authority, Fiscal Year 1992 (Dec. 31, 1992) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Letter from William J. Haltigan,
Regional Administrator, Employment and Training Administration, Region III,
United States Department of Labor, to Robert Connolly, Deputy Secretary, Employ-
ment Security and Job Training 1 (Sept. 19, 1991) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
139. 20 C.F.R. § 650.5 (1995).
140. Letter from William J. Haltigan, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, Region III, United States Department of Labor, to Sharon
M. Dietrich, Community Legal Services 1 (Feb. 4, 1993) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
141. See Letter from Don A. Balcer, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, Region IX, United States Department of Labor, to Alice J.
Gonzales, Director, California Employment Development Department (Sept. 20, 1990)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
142. See Appendix I.
143. Performance Enhancement Design Workpaper, supra note 90, at 15.
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In 1980, it was suggested that a specific performance plan be
required from states that had fallen out of compliance for two
consecutive years.'" Twelve states fell in this category for first-
level appeals in 1980.14 Had this recommendation been adopted,
twelve states would have been subject to this more scrutinized
approach in 1992,146 sixteen in 1993,'14 and twenty-two in
1994.148 Ironically, six of the states identified in the 1980
analysis as warranting this more demanding reporting standard
were still among the list of repeat offenders in recent years.
4 9
5. Lack of Technical Assistance to the States-The USDOL
considers provision of technical assistance to state programs an
appropriate responsibility for it to assume.5 0 Yet fulfillment of
this responsibility during the nationwide appeals promptness
crisis of the early 1990s appears to have been negligible. Ac-
cordingly, states had to identify causes and solutions to their
backlogs on their own.
The USDOL did not assist states in identifying the causes of
their appeals promptness problems.' 5 ' The USDOL, in fact,
currently offers no formal assistance to states that wish to make
projections about unemployment rates or claims. Moreover, state
after state identified problems such as inadequate support staff,
inefficient transcription, and case assignment and coordination
difficulties, without any indication of having received USDOL
guidance on these subjects.
III. REQUIRING IMPROVED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT
OF APPEALS PROMPTNESS
This Part proposes solutions to the weaknesses we have
identified in the USDOL's oversight efforts identified in Part
144. Murray Rubin, The Appeals System, in 3 UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION:
STUDIES AND RESEARCH, supra note 79, at 625, 632.
145. Id.; see also Appendix I.
146. See Appendix I.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Rubin, supra note 144, at 632; see also Appendix I.
150. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 46-94, at 9 (Sept. 30, 1994)
[hereinafter UIPL No. 46-941.
151. The only information the USDOL has about the causes comes from the states
in their CAPs. No investigative procedure exists for the USDOL to obtain information
itself.
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
II.B. These proposed reforms contain essentially two compo-
nents. First, we believe that the USDOL must revise federal
regulations and reporting devices to monitor and motivate
appeals promptness more successfully. Second, we contend that
the USDOL must improve its enforcement efforts directed at
states out of compliance with the timeliness standards. These
proposals extend beyond those receiving active consideration in
the USDOL's pending reform projects." 2
A. Improved Federal Standards
and Reporting Requirements
Since promulgating the current promptness standard for first-
level appeals in 1975, the USDOL has considered revision of the
federal regulations. 153 In 1975, the USDOL agreed that the
feasibility of making the criteria more demanding for the
percentage of first-level appeals to be decided within thirty days
would be re-examined later. 1  Moreover, the National Com-
mission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC) recommended
establishment of a promptness standard for second-level appeals
in its 1980 report.15 5 But although the USDOL created the DLAs
for second-level appeals in fiscal year 1982, it did so without
amending the regulations. 56
During the twenty-year existence of the federal standards for
first-level appeals and the twelve-year existence of the DLAs for
second-level appeals, the flaws of these devices have become
clear. Therefore, we recommend a comprehensive revision of
both the measurement devices and the reporting system, as
specified below.
152. Since this Article was presented at the Symposium, the USDOL has adopted
several new procedures, including some suggested here, in its "UI Performs" system.
For details of the new system, see Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 41-95
(Aug. 24, 1995) and Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 10-96 (Feb. 26,
1996) (both on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
153. Rubin, supra note 144, at 629.
154. Id.
155. NATIONAL COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION: FINAL REPORT 5 (1980) [hereinafter UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: FINAL
REPORT].
156. LEADERSHIP IN APPELLATE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 68, at 4; Rubin, supra
note 144, at 629.
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1. Timeliness Regulations for Second-Level Appeals-The
USDOL should promulgate timeliness regulations for second-
level appeals. This is hardly a new idea. As noted above, the
NCUC acknowledged the desirability of standards for second-
level appeals.'57 Two of the papers submitted to the NCUC also
advocated timeliness regulations for second-level appeals. 5 '
Most importantly, the states' inconsistent performance with
respect to their second-level appeals, which provided the basis
of the NCUC's 1980 recommendations,' 59 has continued to this
date.6 ° This is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the fact
that nine states have been out of compliance with the second-
level DLAs for five consecutive years and show no real signs of
improvement.' 6' Experience clearly has taught that the DLAs
alone will not motivate many states to make the changes
necessary for achieving an appropriate standard of second-level
appeals performance.
One question that has been posed in previous discussions of
this issue is how a single federal standard for appeals prompt-
ness could accommodate the different types of review applied by
second-level appeals authorities. 162 Issues such as a tribunal's
composition, its policy regarding preparation of a hearing
transcript, its method of review of the record, its procedure for
considering input from the parties, and its method and detail
of writing decisions may affect what is the objectively reasonable
period for producing a decision. 63 Because of the diversity of
choices made by the states on these issues, second-level appeals
time lapses provided the most variability of any measure made
in the Performance Measurement Review (PMR) project." The
pursuit of second-level appeals promptness, however, should not
unthinkingly favor speed over quality by forcing states to
abandon some time-consuming steps-such as the preparation
of written transcripts of the first-level hearing-that tend to
improve the quality of their decisions.
Despite these considerations, the USDOL's use of the DLAs
since 1982 is evidence that it is possible to develop standards
157. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: FINAL REPORT, supra note 155, at 5.
158. Owen & Wood, supra note 79, at 649-50; Rubin, supra note 144, at 632.
159. E.g., Owen & Wood, supra note 79, at 650.
160. See supra Part II.A.
161. See Appendix I; Appendix II.
162. Owen & Wood, supra note 79, at 650-51; Rubin, supra note 144, at 632.
163. Owen & Wood, supra note 79, at 648.
164. Borden & Corson, supra note 94, at 47. The PMR project is discussed infra
text accompanying notes 167-68.
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
that can accommodate all types of second-level appeals sys-
tems. 165 Given that states with systems of all types have met the
DLAs, clearly the repeated failure to meet goals is more directly
attributable to the management of a state's system than to
application of a unified measurement.166 Alternatively, several
federal standards for second-level appeals could be developed,
each tailored to the most common features distinguishing
different review systems. For instance, longer intervals might
be justifiable for states such as California that transcribe the
record and write decisions instead of issuing mere judgment
orders.
The USDOL has indicated that promulgating a second-level
appeal promptness regulation will not be attempted before the
implementation of the Performance Management Review and
Performance Enhancement projects.'67 The former is nearly
completed, however, with no apparent position on whether
regulations are necessary to insure compliance.6 8 The latter is
still in progress, and no implications for appeals timeliness have
been made public; however, the trend of that project seems to
be to defer further to the states on oversight issues. 6 9 Moreover,
the USDOL does not even anticipate soliciting comments on the
Performance Enhancement project until fiscal year 1996,"0
165. LEADERSHIP IN APPELLATE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 68, at 4.
166. Owen and Wood justified imposition of a single standard and advocated the
goals which constitute the current DLAs on the grounds that a routine appeal ought
to be processed within 23 to 66 days, and that the lack of a time limit for the 20% of
the decisions not rendered within 75 days provides "breathing room" for cases that
are not routine. Owen & Wood, supra note 79, at 650-52. This approach is consistent
with the regulations that anticipate that the concept of "administratively feasible"
would take into consideration differences between cases involving interstate appeals,
complex issues of fact, reasonable continuances, or "other unforeseen and uncontrolla-
ble factors" not applicable to appeals processing in general. 20 C.F.R. § 650. 1(b) (1995)
(emphasis added). Neither the Social Security Act nor the regulations interpreting
it contemplate relieving a state of its obligations to provide payments "when due"
merely because of the nature of the state system or the state's rate of unemployment.
42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1994); 20 C.F.R. §§ 650.1, 650.3, 650.4 (1995).
167. Letter from Lloyd Fleming, Acting Director, Office of Program Management,
Unemployment Insurance Service, United States Department of Labor, to Maurice
Emsellem, StaffAttorney, National Employment Law Project 3 (Jan. 6, 1995) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Actions to Consider with
Respect to NELP's Recommendations, supra note 67, at 2.
168. The Performance Management Review project would change the way timeli-
ness is measured, such as by increasing the number of reporting intervals and catego-
ries, rather than by dealing with whether the DLAs should be changed into standards.
See Borden & Corson, supra note 94, at 49 fig. V.2.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 220-29.
170. Letter from Lloyd Fleming to Maurice Emsellem, supra note 167, at 2.
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meaning that the USDOL's timeline would postpone implemen-
tation of a second-level timeliness standard until the next
century. Thus, the need for second-level regulations is more
pressing than the USDOL timeline can accommodate.
2. Require Reporting on Pending, Rather Than Decided,
Cases-As discussed previously, the reporting methodology
currently used for both first- and second-level appeals has
several serious defects.'71 Most importantly, it allows a prompt-
ness problem to be hidden: it precludes immediate corrective or
legal action before a backlog becomes serious because a backlog
can be developing even though the reports indicate that the
state is still in compliance. It also permits states to manipulate
their inventories to satisfy the bench marks, to the disadvantage
of claimants with old appeals whose cases are decided after
claimants who have filed more recently.'72 The only real advan-
tage of the current system of measuring decided appeals is that
it is fairly easy to administer. With increasing automation,
however, even this one benefit has become less consequential.
The USDOL recently conducted an Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Case Aging Pilot Project, in which six states measured
the timeliness of pending and decided appeals for six months.
173
It also used the project to consider the possibility of collecting
appeals promptness data on a quarterly, rather than monthly,
basis. 17 4 Analysis of the results of the project has not yet been
completed as of this writing.'75
Some states are likely to oppose a methodology that will better
reveal the extent of stale appeals in their inventories, especially
if they have manipulated their workload successfully in the past
to maximize their performance under current guidelines.
71
171. See supra Part II.B.4.
172. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
173. See Attachment to Memorandum from Barbara A. Farmer, Administrator for
Regional Management, to Armando Quiroz, Regional Administrator, Seattle 1 (Nov.
24, 1993) [hereinafter Attachment to Memorandum from Barbara A. Farmer] (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The six states participating
in the project were Florida, Maryland, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Utah. Id.
174. Id.
175. Telephone Interview with Jack Bright, National Office Coordinator of Unem-
ployment Insurance Appeals Case Aging Pilot Project, Unemployment Insurance
Service, United States Department of Labor (Feb. 17, 1995).
176. Borden and Corson indicate that the Appeals Workgroup of the PMR project
discussed the issue of whether current standards should be changed to add either a
case aging measurement or an average time lapse for all appeals decided in a month,
in order to prevent workload manipulation. The Appeals Workgroup was unable to
resolve the issue. Borden & Corson, supra note 94, at 55.
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Moreover, the USDOL should not require quarterly, rather than
monthly, appeals performance reports, because requiring infor-
mation on a less frequent basis would undermine the goal of
speedier identification of and response to backlog development.
3. Incorporate More Reporting Intervals in the Regulations
and Reports-A flaw in the current measurements of appeals
promptness arises from the use of only four reporting inter-
vals--one to thirty days, thirty-one to forty-five days, forty-six
to seventy-five days, and seventy-six or more days. These
intervals prevent determination of the extent of the delay in the
states with the greatest time-lapse problems. 7 7 This is particu-
larly a problem for second-level appeals, where even a state in
compliance with the DLAs may have 20% of its decisions
completed in the fourth, open-ended interval.178 Because deci-
sions issued 76 or 376 days from the date of appeal are in the
same category for reporting purposes, the lack of further inter-
vals beyond 75 days both hides some significant timeliness
problems and encourages states to de-emphasize resolving cases
that have passed that bench mark. Fortunately, the USDOL
seems prepared to address this issue by increasing the number
of reporting intervals, especially for second-level appeals.'79 A
larger number of intervals was also used in the Unemployment
Insurance Appeals Case Aging Pilot Project. 8 °
What the USDOL has not considered is whether the regu-
lations should be changed to make standards consistent with the
new reporting intervals. Exposure of poor performance alone is
not enough to influence all states to improve their appeals
promptness performance. Instead, the USDOL should utilize
this new data to refine its standards, perhaps requiring that
177. See id. at 6.
178. See, e.g., Owen & Wood, supra note 79, at 652. The timeliness standard for
second-level appeals recommended by Owen and Wood was later incorporated into the
USDOL's DLAs. Id. at 650-52.
179. Under the PMR project, the following reporting intervals would be used for
first-level appeals: 30, 45, 60, 75, 90, 120, and 120+ days. Borden & Corson, supra note
94, at 48. For second-level appeals, the following intervals would be applied: 45, 60,
75, 90, 120, 150, 180, 210, 240, 270, 300, 330, 360, and 360+ days. Id. at 49.
180. Attachment to Memorandum from Barbara A. Farmer, supra note 173.
However, the form used to assess quarterly appeals promptness data contains only
the four intervals currently analyzed under the monthly system. Compare U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Appeals Case Aging Pilot Project Form with Penn-
sylvania's ETA 5-130 Reports (both on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform). Using the current four intervals only makes the proposed quarterly
collection of data even more problematic: the USDOL must wait longer to obtain less
revealing information.
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90% of first-level appeals be resolved in 60 days, and the same
percentage of second-level appeals be concluded in 90 days.
8 1
In addition, the USDOL should create a bench mark by which
all cases should be decided. We suggest that states should strive
for resolving 100% of their first-level appeals within 75 days,
and all second-level appeals within 120 days.
4. Require States to Use a "First In-First Out" Approach to
Their Inventories-The USDOL has recognized that "[flirst in-
first out is clearly the right thing to do."'82 Nevertheless, it has
sidestepped imposing such a principle upon the states.183 It is
not a stretch to interpret the "when due" requirement to mean
that a claimant's appeal should not be secondary to more
recently filed appeals for arbitrary reasons. Thus, we propose
a regulation formalizing this principle, with the caveat that
claimants' appeals may be entitled to prioritization over em-
ployers' appeals during a backlog, as discussed in Section 6
below. 18
4
5. States Should Be Required to Maintain Sub-State Prompt-
ness Data-Although appeals promptness compliance is deter-
mined on a statewide basis, appeal promptness problems often
manifest themselves on a regional or local level. For instance,
if one referee who services several counties resigns and is not
replaced for four months, that area doubtlessly will experience
significant appeals delays, even if the remainder of the state is
well above the goals. Under another scenario, if one region
experiences the brunt of lost personnel during a hiring freeze,
or an increase in filings because of a natural or economic
emergency, the claimants there will experience much more
extreme timeliness problems than those in the state at large.
More problems arise in the situation where appeals resources
are in unjustifiably short supply in one area because the region
is politically disfavored. In California, some of the most severe
delays were experienced in the Los Angeles area, while some
181. Our proposal of a further gradation in the regulations is not unprecedented.
In 1974, when the federal standard for first-level appeals was initially created and
being phased in, it did contain a third prong: 90% of all decisions were to be rendered
within 75 days. 37 Fed. Reg. 16,174 (1972).
182. Actions to Consider with Respect to NELP's Recommendations, supra note
67, at 3.
183. See id. ("[Tihis recommendation would be another substantial record keeping
and reporting burden for the States.").
184. If this principle does not become a Secretary's standard, it should nevertheless
be a subject for oversight of state programs by the USDOL, particularly when a state
appears to be carrying a high level of pending cases despite meeting the goals.
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regions, such as San Francisco, had a much better compliance
record. Legal services advocates traced this disparity to the
difficulty in hiring judges in the Los Angeles area because of
the high cost of living, and to increased filings caused by the
downsizing of the aerospace industry. Accordingly, allocation
of new judges to the Los Angeles area was made an express
element of the consent decree entered in the lawsuit filed
against California.'85
We do not suggest that the USDOL receive timeliness data for
every hearing district in the country. The states should be
required to maintain data by sub-state regions to enable proper
inquiry into whether groups of claimants within the state are
disproportionately disadvantaged by an appeals promptness
problem. While some states maintain data in this manner, 18 6
others do not.
The USDOL agrees that such a practice by the states would
be a good idea, but rejects such a requirement as burdensome
"micromanagement."187 Yet, if this data is not gathered in some
manner, the USDOL's oversight function with respect to sub-
state problems is compromised,'88 and the capacity of represen-
tatives of claimants to seek a remedy is diminished.8 9
185. Consent Decree, Ochoa v. Harvey, No. CIV-S-92-736, at 4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10,
1992).
186. Actions to Consider with Respect to NELP's Recommendations, supra note
67, at 2.
187. Id.
188. The USDOL admits that some of its Regional Administrators have requested
such data from states in which promptness was at issue. Id.
189. Before Pennsylvania's statewide performance for first-level appeals fell out
of compliance with the regulations, advocates considered filing suit solely on behalf
of Philadelphia residents. Anecdotal information indicated that appeals delays were
much worse in Philadelphia than in other parts of the state and that a significant
number of the city's referees had resigned without being replaced. In response to a
"Right to Know" request by legal services advocates, however, the state indicated that
the data that might support such a regional claim did not exist. Letter from Susan
Shinkman, Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, to Sharon
Dietrich, Staff Attorney, Community Legal Services, (Jan. 15, 1992) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Letter from Susan Shinkman, Chief
Counsel, Department of Labor and Industry, to Sharon Dietrich, Staff Attorney,
Community Legal Services, (Feb. 27, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal ofLaw Reform). Claimants' counsel's impression that Philadelphia claimants
had been subject to delays disproportionately was later confirmed by the state's
distribution of resources after negotiations on the delays were completed. Pennsylva-
nia Dep't of Labor and Indus., New Position Distribution Report (Mar. 1, 1993)
(reporting an increased number of hearing referees in Philadelphia, while most other
regions remained the same).
Timeliness in Appeals 269
270 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:1&2
Moreover, the USDOL should communicate clearly to the
states, by program letter 90 if not by more formal devices, that
compliance with appeals promptness standards based on state-
wide data can be undermined by poor regional performance. As
with other suggestions, this would eliminate yet another avenue
for states to manipulate their workloads to maximize their
performance under the standards. More importantly, it would
decrease the likelihood that individual claimants would be
deprived of their entitlement to payment of benefits "when due."
6. Priority of Claimant Appeals During Backlog-Finally,
we submit that when a backlog of appeals has developed that
will require some time to resolve, appeals by claimants ought
to be prioritized over employer appeals. In response to this
suggestion, the USDOL has stated that it "does not appear to
[be] an impartial approach to the appellate process." 19' We do
not pretend that it is. The Social Security Act, however, does not
call for an impartial approach to appeals.'92 Rather, it mandates
that state programs shall be designed to "insure full payment
of unemployment compensation when due."' 93 The statutory
focus on prompt payments, as well as the remedial nature of the
legislation, support the approach of giving priority to claimants,
whose subsistence is at stake, rather than to employers, who
may later be entitled to a credit if benefits have been improperly
paid.
B. Improved USDOL Enforcement Efforts
Toward Noncomplying States
Experience with appeals promptness, both recently and over
the last twenty years, indicates that the USDOL's overall efforts
in its oversight responsibilities simply have not worked. While
some states have responded favorably to hands-on interactions
190. An Unemployment Insurance Program Letter ("UIPL") is a directive setting
forth official agency policy, particularly on minimum federal law requirements for
conformity or compliance. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1-96, 60 Fed.
Reg. 55,609, 55,610 (1995). Because a UIPL is an interpretive rule, it is not subject
to notice and comment under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559.
60 Fed. Reg. at 55,610.
191. Actions to Consider with Respect to NELP's Recommendations, supra note
67, at 3.
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1994).
193. Id. § 503(a)(1).
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with their Regional Administrators, others have not had effec-
tive action demanded of them.'94 Simply bringing a state's
shortcomings to its attention is not enough. The evaluators of
the PMR project noted this reality, observing, "We have found,
partly because PMR is not an official program and does not
contain any formal benchmarks or remedial management
actions, that not all of the Field Test States have acted on
problems detected by PMR to change their administrative
practices or take other remedial actions." 95
For these reasons, it is clear that effective enforcement efforts
directed toward all noncomplying states are essential. From
reviewing the effective oversight activities of several Regional
Administrators, as well as from our own experiences as advo-
cates seeking solutions for appeals delays, we advise that the
following steps be adopted to prevent the recurrence of wide-
spread first-level appeals backlogs and to deal with states that
still suffer appeals promptness problems.
1. Prompt Acknowledgement of Noncompliance-Too often
in the past, a state developed a significant backlog before
hearing from the USDOL. States have been allowed to wait to
address compliance issues until they submit the annual program
budget or quality review time. Because notifying a state of
noncompliance requires such minimal effort, this should not be
permitted to happen in the future. When a state has fallen, or
is poised to fall, out of compliance with the standards or the
DLAs, a corrective letter should be issued to the state immedi-
ately. It stands to reason that a state will be less complacent
about a developing backlog if immediately confronted by its
regulator. The monitoring mechanism for this is already in
place, as the SESAs submit monthly reports to the USDOL on
workload and promptness.
In addition, the USDOL could bring public pressure to bear
on noncomplying states by publicizing their problems. This could
be done directly with a press release, or indirectly with a notice
in the Federal Register. The premise that public scrutiny of a
state's performance can induce compliance is not novel; this idea
is the foundation for the Benefits Quality Control program,
which uses public release of data as an alternative to either
standards or corrective actions.' 96 The public is particularly
194. See supra Part II.C.
195. Borden & Corson, supra note 94, at 5.
196. Performance Enhancement Design Workpaper, supra note 90, at 13.
Timeliness in Appeals
272 University of Michigan Journal of Law Refonn [VOL. 29:1&2
likely to be interested during a recession, when appeals delays
coincide with increased demand for unemployment insurance
benefits.
2. Assignment of a Monitor-States' abstract knowledge that
the monolithic USDOL might take objection to their appeals
delays obviously has not provided sufficient impetus for states
to comply. If states are confronted with a particular USDOL
representative who will scrutinize performance individually until
standards are met-an "appeals monitor"-states' responses
might be very different. This appeals monitor should be viewed
as the agency's conceptual equivalent of the "special master" in
litigation: an individual assigned to examine a complex situation
in the detail necessary to fashion an effective solution.
This person should be delegated enough authority to take or
recommend corrective actions so that she is not perceived as a
toothless bureaucrat who need not be taken seriously. Included
in this authority should be the power to notify the state's
governor that decertification may be appropriate and to rec-
ommend such action to the Secretary of Labor. The monitor's ap-
proach, at least at the beginning, should be cooperative with the
state, with an aim toward solving the problem by providing
expertise and assistance. States should be on notice, however,
that assignment of a monitor could be a precursor to more
formal action.
3. On-Site Compliance Review-The monitor should begin
her work by personally examining the operations and man-
agement of the appeals systems experiencing difficulties. This
inspection should include an examination of articulated factors
that influence claims and appeals processing efficiency. In this
evaluation, the monitor should look for "bottlenecks" in the
appeals process and identify areas in which management or
operations could be improved, in preparation for subsequent
corrective action planning.
4. Development of a Meaningful Corrective Action Plan-
After conducting the on-site review and otherwise evaluating the
reasons for the state's delays, the monitor should work with the
state to plan a strategy for eliminating the backlog. This should
include a specific deadline for correcting the problem. In addi-
tion, the plan must identify an acceptable number of appeals
that may be pending in the state's system at a given point in
time. We suggest that the USDOL encourage the states to try
to reduce their inventory to the point of "equilibrium."'97
197. "Equilibrium" has been used to describe a system that has pending, at any
given time, the number of cases it will receive during the time period necessary to
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Once these goals have been established, projection of the
number of appeals that the state can anticipate in the relevant
future constitutes the next phase in developing a corrective
action plan. The first step in this direction is to track the
number of claims filed as an advance measurement of numbers
of appeals. 9 ' A second step requires forecasting future initial
claims based on past patterns and economic indicators. If the
state lacks the resources to make these projections, the
USDOL's expertise may be helpful. In the event that the
USDOL decides not to use its resources for this purpose, it
should nevertheless insist that the state develop this capacity.
In addition to projecting future appeals, the corrective action
plan must contain valid assumptions about the number of
personnel needed to eliminate the backlog, along with the
expected productivity of decision makers. Merely plugging in
staffing ratios from budget estimates does not result in an
accurate reflection of the personnel needed to resolve significant
delays. The monitor's expertise can assist a state in deciding
how much personnel is needed. Moreover, the monitor can act
as an advocate to support more substantial personnel increases
than a state may be inclined to employ.'99
Hiring additional decision makers is often just one piece of the
puzzle. Sometimes concerns about overexpansion of the case-
handling staff during a crisis can be addressed by redistribution
of existing personnel, such as temporarily reassigning claims
examiners to appeals positions and freely authorizing overtime
work. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that appropriate
levels of support staff are also essential. 00 Quick decisions do
not matter if they are left on a pile waiting to be typed. In
second-level appeals systems, the period required for a tran-
script of the hearing record to be produced is frequently a major
decide the average appeal. Owen & Wood, supra note 79, at 646. For example, if the
SESA decides its average appeal in 45 days, and it receives 2000 appeals per month,
it should have no more than 3000 cases pending at any time.
198. Cf id. at 655 (noting that first-level appeals figures are a reliable measure
for predicting subsequent second-level appeals workloads).
199. State program administrators often face the challenge of arguing for more
personnel or overtime authorization in the face of a state hiring freeze or downsizing.
See supra Part II.B.3. Although funding for appeals staff will likely be reimbursed
by the USDOL, state decision makers refuse approval as a matter of policy, being
reluctant to set"bad precedent." UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: ADMINISTRATIVE FUND-
ING, supra note 87, at 10-11. The USDOL should challenge this political exercise.
200. This point has been noted by the Director of the UIS, who included support
staff in the agenda for her national appeals meeting. Appeals: The Federal Perspective,
supra note 67, at 2.
Timeliness in Appeals 273
274 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:1&2
reason for overall delays. 2 1' The monitor should evaluate the
extent to which more personnel resources are needed for each
job in the appeals process.
5. Providing Technical Assistance on Management and
Efficiency-In addition to providing technical assistance on
projections of future numbers of appeals and personnel needs,
the monitor should be prepared to make recommendations on
the management and efficiency issues needed to improve the
system to meet the demand. The monitor can do this by ana-
lyzing each of the functions performed by personnel assigned to
workload management, clerical duties, and decision making.0 2
Efforts should be made to reduce the time for each step to its
lowest reasonable limit, because each day adds up when aiming
for compliance with the timeliness goals, and every day counts
when a claimant is waiting for a first benefits check as well.203
Among the issues that should be explored are the following:204
1. Transmission of records: Whether a first- or second-level
appeal, valuable time can be lost in moving a claims file
from one level to the next, particularly because the level
from which the file is being transferred is not affected by
the timeliness performance of the next level. Therefore,
consideration of methods to expedite this function is
useful.
2. Systems to track the progress of various steps: If such
systems do not exist, they should be created because
tracking improves accountability. This can be done by
creating forms, or preferably by automation. In the past,
the USDOL has funded computer projects meant to
improve appeals promptness through greater efficiency.20 5
The USDOL should consider a special project that would
develop a standardized computer program or system for
use by the SESAs considering automation.
3. Production of decisions: Time spent writing and typing
decisions can be minimized if standard formats are devel-
oped.
201. Owen & Wood, supra note 79, at 659. Additionally, this problem was men-
tioned by several states in corrective action plans submitted in 1990-1994. See, e.g.,
Michigan FY 1992 Corrective Action Plan Narrative (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
202. Owen & Wood, supra note 79, at 653-54.
203. See id. at 657.
204. See generally id. at 657-64 (suggesting similar time-saving procedures).
205. Actions to Consider with Respect to NELP's Recommendations, supra note
67, at 3.
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4. Productivity goals and measures for staff. Monitoring the
output of decision makers and other staff is likely to
improve efficiency and accountability, as well as to project
needs for additional staff to clear up a backlog.
It should be noted that the USDOL held its first triennial
national meeting on appeals during the summer of 1994 at
which issues like these were addressed.2 °6 It is also necessary,
however, to evaluate these matters in an individualized context
when a state experiences compliance problems.
6. Changes in Administrative Funding-As noted previously,
one problem that states face in financing the expansion of staff
necessary to eliminate a backlog is the existing administrative
funding system. As documented by the United States General
Accounting Office, the states increasingly have been forced to
supplement their federal grants with their own funds to main-
tain their programs.2"' In addition, the inadequacy of the
nonpersonnel services component of their federal grants, which
is designated for overhead such as offices and equipment,
frequently has resulted in personnel services funds being shifted
toward these expenses.20 8 In particular, automation expenses
have resulted in the conversion of personnel services funds.20 9
One state has complained that as a result of these fund shifts,
personnel vacancies have not been filled so that the federal
grant could be used to pay fixed nonpersonnel costs.210
In the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of
1991,211 Congress mandated that the method of allocating unem-
ployment insurance administrative funds be revised.212 The
USDOL has responded by preparing its Administrative Funding
Initiative, scheduled to take effect in October 1997.213 This plan,
206. See James L. Plfasterer, President's Column, NAUIAB NEWSLETTER (National
Ass'n of Unemployment Ins. Appellate Bds., Phoenix, Ariz.), Mar. 1994, at 1, 4
(discussing plans for NAUIB/USDOL joint conference).
207. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: ADMINISTRATIVE FUNDING, supra note 87, at
21-26.
208. Id. at 23-25.
209. Id. at 27.
210. Id. at 25.
211. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-164,
105 Stat. 1049 (codified at scattered sections of 5, 20, 26, 42 and 45 U.S.C. (1994)).
212. Id.
213. For a description of the proposed new administrative financing system, see
UIS Information Bulletin No. 13-94, Administrative Finance Initiative (AFI) De-
scription of Current Proposal (June 7, 1994) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
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however, has already been the subject of vehement criticism by
state officials.214 Whatever form the ultimate revision of the
administrative funding system takes, it must remove current
disincentives to hiring appropriate personnel and avoid creating
new disincentives, so that states can meet their appeals prompt-
ness obligations.
7. Imposition of Penalties-In the Performance Enhance-
ment Project, the USDOL is contemplating possible sanctions
for noncompliance, which stop short of recapturing a state's
administrative grant or denying a state's employers the FUTA
offset credit.215 Certainly, this is a laudable undertaking. We do
not, however, believe that the USDOL can disavow its oversight
obligations in the meantime.
Compliance with the appeals promptness requirements will
be less of a problem when the USDOL closely monitors a
developing situation by providing early warning, insisting on a
meaningful corrective action plan, and furnishing technical
assistance. If this level of oversight were forthcoming whenever
a backlog developed-and available especially in the manner
that we have suggested above-it is less likely that intermediate
penalties would be required.
Expecting compliance in every case, though, no matter how
close the federal supervision, is not realistic. For that reason,
the USDOL must be prepared to initiate steps to revoke states'
administrative funding. Beginning the process does not mean
that it must be completed," 6 but without at least this action, the
threat is meaningless. Moreover, one can expect that only a few
decertification actions would be necessary to convey the message
to the states. At the very least, a mechanism should be estab-
lished whereby the USDOL would notify a SESA that if a
particular goal (e.g., hiring a certain number of judges or
support staff, approving overtime, or reassignment of personnel)
is not met by a certain date, the USDOL will issue a notice
beginning decertification.
214. See Administrative, Support & Technical Comm., Interstate Conference of
Employment Sec. Agencies, Administrative Financing Initiative: An Executive Briefing
on the U.S. Department of Labor's Proposal to Reform the Administrative Funding
Methodology of the Unemployment Insurance System (1994) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
215. Performance Enhancement Design Workpaper, supra note 90, at 15-16.
216. See supra text accompanying note 27 (describing the decertification process).
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C. Insufficiency of the USDOL's Plan of Activities
Relating to Appeals Promptness
In March 1994, the Director of the Unemployment Insurance
Service (UIS) indicated that appeals promptness had become an
"area of emphasis" for fiscal year 1994 because of serious
deficiencies during fiscal years 1991 through 1993.217 One
manifestation of this focus was the UIS's decision to sponsor
regular national and regional appeals meetings in order to
facilitate the sharing of expertise among the states.218 In its
response to the National Employment Law Project's Briefing
Book, however, the USDOL indicates that it is not prepared to
take action with respect to many appeals promptness issues
until decisions are made about implementation of the recom-
mendations of its PMR and Performance Enhancement pro-
jects.219 Based on what we know of these projects, this plan of
action is inadequate.
The PMR project, which was begun in 1988, was designed to
improve upon the Quality Appraisal program.220 It has resulted
in the development of eleven timeliness measures and five
quality measures concerning a broad range of issues.22' Its role
in a solution to the appeals promptness problem, however, is
limited. The PMR will increase reporting intervals and reporting
categories for first- and second-level appeals and standardize
measurements.222 It will not implement the many other regulato-
ry and reporting reforms that we have recommended, such as
promulgating Secretary's standards for second-level appeals,
using the new data to refine the standards by adding bench
marks, requiring states to decide appeals in the order in which
they are filed, or mandating that data be maintained for sub-
state regions.
The Performance Enhancement project is a necessary effort
to rethink federal oversight of state programs.223 This project
217. Appeals: The Federal Perspective, supra note 67, at 1.
218. Id. at 2.
219. Actions to Consider with Respect to NELP's Recommendations, supra note
67, at 1.
220. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 13-95, at 1 (Jan. 5, 1995).
221. Id. at 1-2.
222. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
223. UIPL No. 46-94, supra note 150, at 1-2.
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began when a joint committee of UIS and state officials con-
vened in October 1993.224 The application of principles developed
in this project to appeals promptness is unknown at this time.
Numerous portions of the workgroup's design paper are trou-
bling, however, given that they seem to perpetuate the USDOL's
past ineffectiveness when confronted by state foot dragging.
The Performance Enhancement Design Workpaper explicitly
assumes that active federal hands-on involvement will be
limited, and that states will continue to be responsible primarily
for corrective action to rectify their own deficiencies. 2 5 The
USDOL would not be permitted to require a state to make a
corrective action response until the state has shown itself to be
"resistant" to acting.2 6 "Intermediate" penalties for inducing
compliance are not anticipated until either the state rejects the
USDOL's suggested actions or there have been ineffectual
corrective actions over an extended period of time.227 A second
level of actions would apply to egregious state nonperformance,
and only nonperformance, of USDOL standards.228
Based on our prior comments, our opinion that this regime
of oversight is much too deferential and superficial should
come as no surprise. Simply put, allowing the states to correct
their own problems has not worked. The experience of the
past few years justifies more, not less, effective federal over-
sight of the state programs. Moreover, the tone of the Design
Workpaper suggests a disinclination to promulgate federal
regulations, such as standards for second-level appeals. 229 If
the initial signals foreshadow the final results, the Perfor-
mance Enhancement Project will not provide the solutions
that we seek, but rather will aggravate the problems that we
have discussed in this Article.
224. Id. at 1.
225. Performance Enhancement Design Workpaper, supra note 90, at 8.
226. Id. at 15. In fact, the report suggests that if the USDOL's judgment about an
appropriate solution differs from that of a state when the USDOL first initiates a
dialogue concerning a deficiency, the state's judgment should prevail initially, until
the result is confirmed in the next measurement period. Id. at 14.
227. Id. at 15.
228. Id. at 16.
229. In an era of shrinking federal resources, promulgation of regulations is much
more consistent with the USDOL's oversight obligation than delegating more respon-
sibility to the states. Regulations better permit claimants to act as partners in over-
sight through advocacy aimed at enforcing their interests as delineated by the stan-
dards. Moreover, the regulatory process permits all interested parties to provide
input into the final policy decisions reflected in the regulations.
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CONCLUSION
We do not wish to suggest that speed is the only desirable
characteristic of a quality appeals system. Indeed, the "fair
hearing" component of federal law23° is no less a requirement
than the "when due" provision. In particular, it is not appro-
priate for states that have been under pressure to comply with
appeals promptness goals to curtail severely the period of
notice of hearings or to implement unreasonable policies about
requests for continuances. This is particularly true when such
policies prejudice claimants, the parties whom the "when due"
provision is meant to benefit. Providing opportunities for exten-
sions in cases with unusual circumstances can easily be accom-
modated by the regulations and the DLAs.
To correct the appeals promptness problems that we have
documented, it is crucial that reforms be implemented as
quickly and comprehensively as possible, not on a piecemeal
basis in the indefinite future. As we described at the beginning
of this Article, lengthy delays exact a human toll. Certainly,
failure to correct these problems before the next recession
would be unsupportable. Immediate and effective action from
the federal level is required given the number of states out of
compliance at this time with first- or second-level appeals goals
and the resulting implication that this has become a perma-
nent problem.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (1994).
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APPENDIX I
STATES OUT OF COMPLIANCE FOR Two CONSECUTIVE YEARS
FIRST-LEVEL APPEALS
1992 1993 1994 1995
Connecticut Connecticut Connecticut Connecticut
Maine Maine Maine Maine
New New New New
Hampshire Hampshire Hampshire Hampshire
New York New York New York New York
Puerto Rico Puerto Rico Puerto Rico Puerto Rico
District of District of District of District of
Columbia Columbia Columbia Columbia
Michigan Michigan Michigan Michigan
Minnesota Minnesota Minnesota Minnesota
Ohio Ohio Ohio Ohio
Wisconsin Wisconsin Wisconsin Wisconsin
Alaska Alaska Alaska Alaska














SOURCES.-UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR-
ANCE QUALITY APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 90-FY 94; ETA 5-130, November 1994, produced
in response to FOIA No. 2.
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STATES OUT OF COMPLIANCE FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE YEARS
SECOND-LEVEL APPEALS
1992 1993 1994 1995
New York New York New York New York
District of District of District of District of
Columbia Columbia Columbia Columbia
Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Pennsylvania
Michigan Michigan Michigan Michigan
Ohio Ohio Ohio Ohio
Colorado Colorado Colorado Colorado
Arizona Arizona Arizona Arizona
California California California California
Idaho Idaho Idaho Idaho



















SOURCES.-UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE QuALrrY APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 90-FY 94, fig. 111-35.
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